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CLOUD COMPUTING: THE NEXT GREAT
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, THE DEATH
OF ONLINE PRIVACY, OR BOTH?
Derek Constantine*
INTRODUCTION
Google Docs1 is a service used by individuals and, in its Google
Apps2 form, by businesses and educators.3 Google Docs allows a user
to log on to his Google account on any computer and create text
documents, spreadsheets, and a variety of other documents while
saving everything remotely—allowing that same user to log off one
computer, log on to another computer, and continue to work on the
same document.4 Additionally, multiple users can access and edit the
same document in Google Docs at the same time to facilitate
collaborative work.5 The use of Google Docs is increasing, with
Google claiming to have over two million users.6 Google Docs is a
form of what is generically referred to as cloud computing—online
services that provide “the ability to run applications and store data on
a service provider’s computers over the Internet, rather than on a
person’s desktop computer.”7 With the growth of online storage and
*
J.D./M.B.A. Candidate, 2013, Georgia State University College of Law. Thanks to Professor Russell
Covey and everyone involved with the Georgia State Law Review for their valuable feedback and
suggestions, and thanks to my wife Sarah for her love and encouragement.
1. Docs, GOOGLE, http://docs.google.com/ (last visited May 26, 2011).
2. Apps for Business, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/apps/ (last visited May 26, 2011).
3. See
generally
About
Google
Apps,
GOOGLE,
http://docs.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?hl=en-uk&answer=60982 (last visited May 26, 2011)
(detailing the differences between Apps and Docs).
4. Online, Free Spreadsheets from Google, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/google-ds/spreadsheets/ (last visited May 26, 2011) [hereinafter Free Spreadsheets]; Online, Free Word
Processing with Google Documents, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/google-d-s/documents/ (last
visited May 26, 2011) [hereinafter Free Word Processing]; What’s New in Google Docs?, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/google-d-s/whatsnew.html (last visited May 26, 2011).
5. What’s New in Google Docs?, supra note 4.
6. Office Politics: Microsoft Bids to Keep Its Grip on Corporate Computing Against Google’s
Challenge, ECONOMIST (May 13, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/16113333.
7. William Jeremy Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under the Stored
Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1199 (2010).
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computing services by companies such as Microsoft and Google,8
now more than ever any person with a basic computer and an Internet
connection can store files remotely,9 borrow processing
capabilities,10 write documents,11 work on spreadsheets,12 or create
presentations13—all through convenient, simple, and often free online
services.14 Given the low cost and ease of use, cloud computing
seems like an attractive option to consumers who are cost-conscious
but still want the newest software and services.15 And yet, despite the
optimism around cloud computing, many businesses and individuals
have been slow to adopt the new services.16 Companies and
individuals have expressed concerns about privacy—including
concerns about the government’s apparent ability to search and seize
files stored in the cloud without Fourth Amendment restraint—as a
major reason for the lack of cloud computing adoption.17
8. Brad Stone & Ashlee Vance, “Cloud” Computing Casts a Spell, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2010, at
B1 (“[C]loud providers are trying to bring these [cloud] services to the more conservative and lucrative
world of large corporations.”); Clash of the Clouds: The Launch of Windows 7 Marks the End of an Era
in Computing—and the Beginning of an Epic Battle Between Microsoft, Google, Apple and Others,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 17, 2009, at 80, available at http://www.economist.com/node/14637206.
9. MobileMe, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/mobileme/ (last visited May 26, 2011) (on file with
Georgia State University Law Review). MobileMe service is now closed to new subscribers and will
transition
to
Apple
iCloud,
which
provides
similar
services.
ICloud,
APPLE,
http://www.apple.com/icloud/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2011).
10. Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), AMAZON.COM, http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/ (last
visited May 26, 2011); Amazon Web Services: Terms of Use, AMAZON.COM,
http://aws.amazon.com/terms/ (last visited May 26, 2011). See generally Clouds Under the Hammer:
Processing Capacity is Becoming a Tradable Commodity, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2010, at 69 (discussing
the evolution of the commoditization of processing power).
11. Free Word Processing, supra note 4.
12. Free Spreadsheets, supra note 4.
13. Free, Embeddable Presentations from Google, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/google-ds/presentations/ (last visited May 26, 2011).
14. Docs, supra note 1 (“It’s easy to get started and it’s free!”).
15. Battle of the Clouds: The Fight to Dominate Cloud Computing Will Increase Competition and
Innovation, ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 2009, at 16, available at http://www.economist.com/node/14644393;
Stone & Vance, supra note 8, at B1 (“In Amazon’s model, businesses pay only for the computing cycles
they use. Customers eliminate the upfront cost of computer hardware and can then buy more time on
Amazon’s data center as needed.”). See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, HOT, FLAT, AND CROWDED:
WHY WE NEED A GREEN REVOLUTION—AND HOW IT CAN RENEW AMERICA 232–33 (2008)
(describing vision for the “job of the future” in which the individual will stay home and log onto her
company’s system where she will access her files, run programs, and perform her job entirely remotely).
16. Cloudy with a Chance of Rain: Few Companies Are Ready to Accept Cloud Computing,
ECONOMIST (Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/15640793.
17. Id.; see discussion infra Part I.A.; see also Stone & Vance, supra note 8, at B1 (“[Companies]
fear that their confidential information could be vulnerable on another company’s system, out of their
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A close examination of the terms of the service agreement that
apply to Google’s services may surprise some users.18 Google
acknowledges that users retain any “copyright and any other rights
[users] already hold in Content which [users] submit, post or display
on or through” its services. It further states, however, that “[b]y
submitting, posting or displaying the content [users] give Google a
perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide, royalty-free, and non-exclusive
license to reproduce, adapt, modify, translate, publish, publicly
perform, publicly display and distribute any Content which [users]
submit, post or display on or through” Google’s services.19
Considering the expansive nature of the terms of Google’s general
service agreement and assuming consumers actually read the
agreement rather than blindly clicking “agree,” users may wonder
what level of privacy their files will have if uploaded or sent through
one of Google’s services.
What privacy rights apply to electronic and online files is an issue
that courts are struggling to develop20 and that the United States
Supreme Court has only recently and very cursorily addressed.21 The
controlling legislation on privacy rights related to online activities
such as email and cloud computing activities is the Stored
Communications Act (SCA),22 part of the Electronic
control.”); Jonathan Zittrain, Lost in the Cloud, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2009, at A19 (“[T]he federal
government has been able to demand some details of your online activities from service providers—and
not to tell you about it.”); Fuzzy Maths: In a Few Short Years, Google Has Turned from a Simple and
Popular Company into a Complicated and Controversial One, ECONOMIST, May 13, 2006, at 79,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/6911096 (“[P]rivacy advocates voiced concerns over
[Google’s] practice of placing advertisements in contextually related e-mail messages on its webmail
service.”).
18. Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS (last visited May 26,
2011); see also Google Docs: Additional Terms of Service, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/google-ds/intl/en/addlterms.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2011).
19. Google Terms of Service, supra note 18.
20. See, e.g., Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 910 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub
nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (finding employees had a reasonable
expectation of privacy with their text messages).
21. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628, 2633 (2010) (holding that employer’s search of
employee’s text message did not violate the Fourth Amendment and, assuming arguendo for the sake of
dismissing the case on other grounds, that the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
text messages).
22. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat. 1848,
1860–68 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006)).

Published by Reading Room, 2012

3

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 6

502

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:2

Communications Privacy Act of 1986.23 Given that the SCA was
enacted in the 1980s, courts have struggled to apply it to the
Internet,24 and legal scholars have attempted to understand and
interpret the Act’s application.25 In addition to the lingering questions
over the applicability of the SCA, there are questions as to whether
the Fourth Amendment applies to Internet environments26 and, if it
does, how it applies.27 The Ninth Circuit recently commented, “The
extent to which the Fourth Amendment provides protection for the
contents of electronic communications in the Internet age is an open
question.”28
Part I of this Note will provide a brief historical background on the
development and current state of both the SCA and the Fourth
Amendment.29 Part II of this Note will examine the applicability of
the SCA to online environments and specifically to files uploaded to
cloud computing environments.30 Part II will then examine the Fourth
Amendment and analyze whether it can be effectively applied to
23. Id.
24. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d at 900 (discussing whether a wireless phone
provider was an Electronic Communication Service under the Stored Communications Act and whether
employees had a reasonable expectation of privacy with their text messages); Crispin v. Christian
Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 987 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (finding private messaging and web mail
services constitute Electronic Communication Services under the Stored Communications Act).
25. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1209–13 (2004); Scott Ness, The Anonymous Poster: How
to Protect Internet Users’ Privacy and Prevent Abuse, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8, ¶6 (2010); Evan
E. North, Facebook Isn’t Your Space Anymore: Discovery of Social Networking Websites, 58 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1279, 1307 (2010); Jennifer Heidt White, Text Message Monitoring After Quon v. Arch Wireless:
What Private Employers Need to Know About the Stored Communications Act and an Employee’s Right
to Privacy, 5 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 19, para. 3 (2009), available at
http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspacelaw/bitstream/handle/1773.1/433/vol5_no4_art19.pdf?sequence=1; see Robison, supra note 7, at 1196.
26. State v. Bellar, 217 P.3d 1094, 1110–11 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (“Nor are a person’s privacy rights
in electronically stored personal information lost because that data is retained in a medium owned by
another. Again, in a practical sense, our social norms are evolving away from the storage of personal
data on computer hard drives to retention of that information in the ‘cloud,’ on servers owned by
internet service providers. . . . I suspect that most citizens would regard that data as no less confidential
or private because it was stored on a server owned by someone else.”).
27. David A. Couillard, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles to Evolving
Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2206 (2009); Orin S. Kerr, Applying
the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (2010).
28. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d at 904.
29. See discussion infra Part I.
30. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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cloud computing environments and provide privacy protection to
users from “unreasonable searches and seizures”31 by the
government.32 Finally, Part III will recommend that the SCA should
apply to both webmail services and cloud computing environments
and that the Fourth Amendment’s protection should be digitized and
applied to the cloud computing environment, providing adequate
privacy rights to people in “the Internet age.”33
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCA AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. The Current State of the Stored Communications Act
The SCA is the primary legislation controlling privacy rights
related to online activities such as email and general cloud computing
activities.34 Congress recognized the importance of the growing
computer industry in the 1980s and put into place legislation dealing
with privacy rights related to the networking activities occurring at
that time.35 The SCA distinguishes between two types of electronic
services—Electronic Communication Services (ECS)36 and Remote
Computing Services (RCS).37 For the SCA to control the fate of an
electronic message or file, the service provider that hosts the message
or file must be considered an Electronic Communication Services
provider or a Remote Computing Services provider under the SCA.38
So the ultimate fate of any electronic message or file under the SCA

31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32. See discussion infra Part II.B.
33. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d at 904; see infra Part III.
34. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat. 1848,
1860–68 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006)).
35. Id. See generally Kerr, supra note 25.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2006) (“[A] person or entity providing an electronic communication
service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a
communication while in electronic storage by that service . . . .”). See generally Robison, supra note 7,
at 1205–14.
37. § 2702(a)(2) (“[A] person or entity providing remote computing service to the public shall not
knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of any communication which is carried or
maintained on that service . . . .”). See generally Robison, supra note 7, at 1205–14.
38. § 2702(a).
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is determined much more by the classification of the service provider
that hosts the message or file than by the message or file itself.39
1. Electronic Communication Service
For a message to fall under the language of the Electronic
Communication Service section of the SCA, the Electronic
Communication Service provider must provide “the ability to send or
receive wire or electronic communications.”40 In addition, the
message must be “in electronic storage.”41 Electronic storage under
the SCA is “any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or
electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission
thereof”42 or “any storage of such communication by an electronic
communication service for purposes of backup protection.”43
Although the language may seem complex, the essential
characteristic of a message qualifying for ECS protection is that it
must either be held by the provider only temporarily during
transmission itself or be held by the provider for “backup
protection.”44
With the increase in Gmail and other webmail services, providers’
large storage limits allow users to store a message on the provider’s
server rather than download it to the user’s computer.45 It is unclear
whether the stored message will actually qualify as a communication
under the ECS language. The message is not temporarily held by the
provider “incidental to the electronic transmission thereof,”46 since
the message is left permanently on the provider’s server until the user
deletes it. Although users may claim a message is left on the
provider’s server as “backup protection,”47 courts may not agree,
39. Id.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006).
41. § 2702(a)(1).
42. § 2510(17)(A).
43. § 2510(17)(B).
44. Id.
45. Gmail:
Your
Storage
Limit,
GOOGLE,
http://mail.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=6558 (last visited Aug. 3, 2011) (“Gmail offers
more than 7 GB of free storage for your messages and attachments . . . .”).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A).
47. § 2510(17)(B).
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since there is only one copy of the message—it is not being backed
up from anywhere else.48 The message only exists on the provider’s
server.49 Given those considerations, the status of an email message
sent from or to a webmail address is unclear, with courts often in
complete disagreement as to how such messages should be
categorized.50
Under the SCA, the Government must get a warrant to retrieve a
message that has been in storage for 180 days or less and that is being
held by a provider that qualifies as an Electronic Communication
Service provider.51 A subpoena or a court order, rather than a
warrant, can be enough for a message that has been in storage for
more than 180 days with prior notice to the subscriber or customer.52
So for a message that has been held in storage for less than 180 days,
the status of a service provider can have significant consequences on
how easily the Government can obtain a message under the ECS
language.
2. Remote Computing Service
To be considered a Remote Computing Service provider, a
company must provide “computer storage or processing services by
48. See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 773 (C.D. Ill. 2009) (finding emails that
have been opened are not in temporary storage incidental to transmission and are not in electronic
storage so the government does not need a warrant to obtain copies of the emails); See Gmail: Your
Storage Limit, supra note 45.
49. Gmail: Your Storage Limit, supra note 45.
50. Courts have addressed the question of whether the Stored Communications Act applies to emails
far more frequently than they have addressed other cloud computing services and, while unopened email
messages are generally recognized as messages in electronic storage, courts often directly contradict one
another regarding opened email messages. See Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 773. But see Theofel v.
Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding opened emails kept on a server are
considered to be kept for backup purposes since the language of the Stored Communications Act “does
not distinguish between intermediate and post-transmission storage”); Crispin v. Christian Audigier,
Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 987 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (finding private messaging and web mail constitute
communications under the Electronic Communication Services language, and social networking sites
are Electronic Communication Services); Jennings v. Jennings, 697 S.E.2d 671, 677–78 (S.C. Ct. App.
2010), reh’g denied, 2010 S.C. App. LEXIS 176 (S.C. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2010) (holding that opened
emails are stored for backup protection and, thus, qualify as communication under the Electronic
Communication Service language if they are left on the server merely “in the event that the user needs to
retrieve [the messages] again”).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
52. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(b) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
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means of an electronic communications system.”53 The SCA
considers an electronic communications system to be a facility “for
the transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any
computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic
storage of such communications.”54 The content of an electronic file
held by a Remote Computing Service provider may only fit within
the SCA if the file is maintained “solely for the purpose of providing
storage or computer processing services to [a] subscriber or
customer.”55
Given the complexities in a cloud computing environment,
providers may not meet these requirements since the language of the
SCA is dated and cryptic.56 As with Electronic Communication
Services, the courts have embraced a broad array of interpretations of
the RCS language.57
Even if courts consider a provider to be a Remote Computing
Service, a government entity can entirely avoid having to get a
warrant to retrieve an electronic file under the RCS language,58
unlike the language found under the ECS requiring a warrant for
messages that are less than 180 days old.59 With prior notice to the
subscriber or customer, a government entity can either obtain a court
order by offering “specific and articulable facts showing that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or
electronic communication, or the records or other information sought,
are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation” or by
obtaining a subpoena for disclosure.60 So even if a cloud computing

53. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2006).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(14) (2006).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2) (2006).
56. See Kerr, supra note 25, at 1214–15.
57. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding Youtube
qualified as a Remote Computing Service because the court considered Youtube’s access to be
connected to its provision of storage services); see also Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 363
(E.D. Mich. 2008) (finding that “the archive maintained by [the service provider] constitutes ‘computer
storage,’ and that the company’s maintenance of this archive on behalf of the City is a ‘remote
computing service’ as defined under the SCA”).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B) (2006).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
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service is considered a Remote Computing Service under the SCA,
little privacy protection is extended to the consumer.
B. The Current State of the Fourth Amendment
In addition to the SCA, the Fourth Amendment may influence
privacy rights online.61 The Fourth Amendment provides people the
right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures”62 and goes on to specify
that warrants should only be issued “upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”63 The expression
that a person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” was first
introduced in Katz v. United States,64 where the Court found that a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists when two requirements are
met: “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”65 The Court in Katz
further specified that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.”66 Given the Court’s focus on the individual’s right to privacy
rather than merely the setting in which the individual finds herself,67
later courts have been willing to interpret broadly the Fourth
Amendment’s simple statement extending protection to “persons,
houses, papers, and effects.”68 The idea of a reasonable expectation
61. See discussion infra Part I.B.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
63. Id.
64. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A]n enclosed
telephone booth is an area where . . . a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy . . . .”).
65. Id. at 361.
66. Id. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” (citations omitted)); see also United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822–23 (1982) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of
every container that conceals its contents from plain view. But the protection afforded by the
Amendment varies in different settings.” (citing Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 427 (1981))).
67. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 335 (2000); Doe ex rel. Doe v.
Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 351 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Freire, 710 F.2d 1515, 1519
(11th Cir. 1983).
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of privacy has been applied to a variety of new areas as the
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment has evolved.69
The concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy has been
applied to searches of computers, with courts often focusing on
whether a party has been explicitly informed that his computer is
subject to searches.70 Courts are somewhat divided when applying
the reasonable expectation considerations to wireless and online
services such as email accounts. They have often directly
contradicted each other at the fundamental level of whether or not
they should start their analysis under the assumption that an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding online
communication.71
69. Bond, 529 U.S. at 335 (finding law enforcement’s physical manipulation of a person’s carry-on
bag was a violation of the Fourth Amendment); Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (“No less than an individual in a
business office, in a friend’s apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the
protection of the Fourth Amendment.”); Doe, 380 F.3d at 351 (finding school policy of conducting
random searches of backpacks and purses violated the Fourth Amendment); Freire, 710 F.2d at 1519
(finding Fourth Amendment privacy rights in a briefcase by stating that “[f]ew places outside one’s
home justify a greater expectation of privacy than does the briefcase.”).
70. Maes v. Folberg, 504 F. Supp. 2d 339, 347 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (finding employee “had an
expectation of privacy in her laptop computer” because there were no policies or practices in place that
eliminated the employee’s reasonable expectation); see also Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741,
743 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his work computer
because his employer “had announced that it could inspect the laptops that it furnished for the use of its
employees,” but there could be a right of privacy in employer-owned equipment under the Fourth
Amendment as long as it was reasonable).
71. Compare United States v. Valdivieso Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d 332, 339 (D.P.R. 2007)
(stating that “an expectation of privacy has generally not been found to exist with regard to subscriber
information provided by service users to their internet service providers, records on individuals’ internet
usage or as to communications made on an internet website” while courts have also been hesitant to find
“a reasonable expectation of privacy to exist in e-mail or electronic chat-room communications”), and
United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184–85 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (finding that “the
transmitter of an e-mail message enjoys a reasonable expectation that police officials will not intercept
the transmission without probable cause and a search warrant” until such time as the recipient of the
message “forwards the e-mail to a third party,” at which time the message does “not enjoy the same
reasonable expectations of privacy” (quoting United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F.
1996))), with City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628, 2633 (2010) (holding that employer’s
search of employee’s text messages was reasonable since employer’s stated policy allowed employer to
monitor all network activity and assuming arguendo that employee had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his text messages but not ruling on the issue), and Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529
F.3d 892, 910 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (finding
employees had a reasonable expectation of privacy with their text messages), and State v. Bellar, 217
P.3d 1094, 1107 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (stating that “defendant did not . . . lose his protected privacy
interest in the data stored on the hard drive of his computer and that the privacy interest continued after
the data was transferred”).
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The Ninth Circuit held in Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co.
that an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text
messages they sent and received.72 However, the United States
Supreme Court in City of Ontario v. Quon reversed that decision in
light of the employer’s stated policy permitting it to access employee
text messages.73 The Court in City of Ontario v. Quon did not directly
address the reasonable expectation of privacy of the employee,
merely assuming arguendo that the employee had a reasonable
expectation.74 By focusing on a party’s expectation of privacy and
society’s recognition that the expectation is reasonable, the Court
returned to its views expressed in Katz.75
II. ATTEMPTING APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND
THE SCA WHILE CONSIDERING THE PROBLEM OF THE THIRD PARTY
DOCTRINE
A. Applying the Fourth Amendment
Applying the Fourth Amendment to any cloud computing
environment engenders great confusion.76 Despite this lack of clarity,
several recent decisions apply the Fourth Amendment to various
networked and wireless situations, showing courts’ willingness to
provide Fourth Amendment protection to cloud computing
environments.77 In State v. Bellar, the court commented that the
“social norms are evolving away from the storage of personal data on
computer hard drives to retention of that information in the ‘cloud’”
and that “most citizens would regard that data as no less confidential
or private because it was stored on a server owned by someone
72. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d at 910.
73. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2628, 2633 (holding that employer’s search of employee’s
text messages was reasonable since employer’s stated policy allowed employer to monitor all network
activity).
74. Id.
75. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
76. See discussion supra Part I.B.
77. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d at 910 (finding employees had a reasonable
expectation of privacy with their text messages); State v. Bellar, 217 P.3d 1094, 1107 (Or. Ct. App.
2009) (“[D]efendant did not . . . lose his protected privacy interest in the data stored on the hard drive of
his computer and that the privacy interest continued after the data was transferred.”).
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else.”78 In Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., the court stressed
the importance of an employee having both “a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the item seized or the area searched” and
“demonstrat[ing] that the search was unreasonable” to show there
was a Fourth Amendment violation.79 Before Quon v. Arch Wireless
Operating Co. was reversed, the court held that there was a
reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the employee as to
the content of his text messages.80
In reversing Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., the United
States Supreme Court unfortunately chose not to address the
reasonable expectation of privacy issue, leaving confusion in its
wake.81 However, given the ever increasing importance of online
environments, lower courts have followed the Supreme Court’s
78. Bellar, 217 P.3d at 1110, 1111 (“Nor are a person’s privacy rights in electronically stored
personal information lost because that data is retained in a medium owned by another.”).
79. The court acknowledged that it was facing a new issue and set a threshold question to be
answered. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d at 904 (stating that “[t]he extent to which the
Fourth Amendment provides protection for the contents of electronic communications in the Internet
age is an open question” and asking “the threshold question: Do users of text messaging services . . .
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their text messages stored on the service provider’s
network?”).
80. The court makes a distinction between the “outside” of a text message—the information required
to send a text message—and the “inside” of a text message—the content of the message itself. Quon v.
Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d at 905 (“As with letters and e-mails, it is not reasonable to
expect privacy in the information used to ‘address’ a text message . . . . However, users do have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of their text messages vis-a-vis the service provider.”).
81. The Court acknowledged the importance of the issue but expressed concern in making too broad
a ruling before the Court properly understood the potential implications a ruling could have:
Before turning to the reasonableness of the search, it is instructive to note the parties’
disagreement over whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
....
. . . Prudence counsels caution before the facts in the instant case are used to establish farreaching premises that define the existence, and extent, of privacy expectations enjoyed
by employees when using employer-provided communication devices.
....
A broad holding concerning employees’ privacy expectations vis-à-vis employerprovided technological equipment might have implications for future cases that cannot be
predicted.
City of Ontario, v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629–30 (2010). The Court ultimately reversed on the
grounds that the search was motivated by legitimate, employment-related concerns and the policy in
place was that pager messages were available for review, which allowed the court to reverse while
assuming arguendo that the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy without actually
addressing the issue. Id. at 2629–30 (“The record does establish that [the employer], at the outset, made
it clear that pager messages were not considered private. The [employer]’s Computer Policy stated that
‘[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using’ [employer] computers.”).
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decision in Katz v. United States by applying the Fourth Amendment
to the individual rather than the situation82 and interpreting the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonable expectation of privacy to apply to
networked, online, or wireless situations.83
B. Applying the SCA
Given the often directly contradictory court decisions,84 it is very
difficult for practitioners to anticipate the outcome of cases involving
electronic messages or electronic files. Despite these disparate
holdings, two recent cases concerning electronic messages provide a
broader interpretation of the Electronic Communications Services
language and thus, more protection to users of cloud computing
services.85 In Jennings v. Jennings, the court addressed the ongoing
controversy as to whether an opened email message left on the
service provider’s server is left for “backup protection.”86 The court,
holding that such messages are left for backup protection,
commented that “one of the purposes of storing a backup copy of an
email message on an ISP’s server after it has been opened is so that
the message is available in the event that the user needs to retrieve it
again.”87 In Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., the court found that a
webmail service provider and two social networking sites were
Electronic Communication Service providers.88 These holdings show

82. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.”).
83. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d at 905; Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717
F. Supp. 2d 965, 987 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Bellar, 217 P.3d at 1107.
84. See discussion supra Part I.A.
85. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 987; Jennings v. Jennings, 697 S.E.2d 671, 677–78 (S.C. Ct. App.
2010), reh’g denied, 2010 S.C. App. LEXIS 176 (S.C. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2010).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(B) (2006); Jennings, 697 S.E.2d at 677–78.
87. Jennings, 697 S.E.2d at 677–78 (“In the present case, the previously opened emails were stored
on Yahoo’s servers so that, if necessary, [the user] could access them again. Accordingly, we hold that
the emails in question were stored ‘for purposes of backup protection.’”).
88. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 981–82 (“There . . . is no basis for distinguishing between Media
Temple’s webmail and Facebook’s and MySpace’s private messaging, on the one hand, and traditional
web-based email on the other. As a consequence, the court concludes that each of Media Temple,
Facebook, and MySpace is an ECS provider.”). But see Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650,
656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (holding that plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of privacy in social
networking sites, “as neither Facebook nor MySpace guarantee complete privacy”).
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that, despite previous courts’ decisions to the contrary,89 the debate
over interpreting the ECS language is swaying in the direction of
providing greater protection to electronic messages. The court in
Crispin also took a very broad interpretation of the RCS language
and found the three sites to be Remote Computing Service
providers.90 This holding suggests that courts are willing to qualify
such service providers under the SCA language.91
Interpreting the SCA remains difficult given the lack of precedent
and continuity across jurisdictions.92 If the Ninth Circuit’s recent
interpretation in Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co. of Fourth
Amendment protections to electronic communications is at all
suggestive of an interest in increased Fourth Amendment protections
online,93 courts may need to broaden their interpretations of the SCA.
They may need to apply the SCA to a more diverse group of service
providers to prevent the SCA from providing less protection to
electronic communications and files than the Fourth Amendment will
provide.94
89. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that
the Electronic Communication Service language “is specifically targeted at communications temporarily
stored by electronic communications services incident to their transmission—for example, when an
email service stores a message until the addressee downloads it. The statute’s language explicitly refers
to ‘temporary, intermediate’ storage” and further stating that the Electronic Communication Service
language “only protects electronic communications stored ‘for a limited time’ in the ‘middle’ of a
transmission, i.e. when an electronic communication service temporarily stores a communication while
waiting to deliver it”).
90. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 987 (“As respects messages that have been opened and retained by
Crispin, . . . [Facebook, MySpace, and Media Temple] operate as RCS providers providing storage
services . . . .”).
91. Id. (“[U]nder the reasoning of . . . Flagg, . . . the three entities operate as RCS providers
providing storage services . . . .”); Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 363 (E.D. Mich. 2008)
(finding that “the archive maintained by [the service provider] constitutes ‘computer storage,’ and that
the company’s maintenance of this archive on behalf of the City is a ‘remote computing service’ as
defined under the SCA”).
92. Compare Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 981–82, with Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
93. Despite the United States Supreme Court’s reversal of Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co. in
City of Ontario v. Quon on other grounds, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower court in holding that
an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2633
(2010); Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 910 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. City of
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010); Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116,
1141 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
94. The concern is that if courts interpret the SCA narrowly and only allow it to apply to a minimum
number of service providers while, at the same time, courts interpret the Fourth Amendment broadly and
allow it to apply to a variety of online environments, the SCA may prove to be unconstitutional when
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C. Third Party Doctrine May Control
No matter how a court decides to apply the SCA and the Fourth
Amendment in a cloud computing context, application of the Third
Party Doctrine may ultimately be the deciding factor in a case
involving cloud computing. The Third Party Doctrine, recognized in
a concurrence in Katz v. United States,95 asserts that a party’s free
exchange of information with a third party essentially destroys the
reasonable expectation of privacy upon which much of the Fourth
Amendment’s protection is based.96 The Third Party Doctrine has
been applied to a number of Fourth Amendment cases97 based on the
sentiment expressed in Katz that it is reasonable for an individual to
assume that any party with whom he or she shares any information is
“recording [the information] or transmitting it to another.”98 In Smith
v. Maryland,99 the Court held that a person did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dialed into a phone
since the numbers had to be shared with the phone company to
courts encounter a situation in which the Fourth Amendment protects a certain file or message while the
SCA, due to its narrow interpretation, provides little or no protection to the service provider—and thus
to the file or message. See discussion supra Part II.B (detailing the recent rulings regarding a reasonable
expectation of electronic privacy); discussion infra Part III.B.2.
95. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 363 (1967) (White, J., concurring)(“When one man speaks
to another he takes all the risks ordinarily inherent in so doing, including the risk that the man to whom
he speaks will make public what he has heard. The Fourth Amendment does not protect against
unreliable (or law-abiding) associates. It is but a logical and reasonable extension of this principle that a
man take the risk that his hearer, free to memorize what he hears for later verbatim repetitions, is instead
recording it or transmitting it to another.” (citation omitted)).
96. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
97. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (holding that a phone number dialed by the
petitioner was not protected by a Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy because the
phone number was shared with the phone company and concluding that the court has “consistently . . .
held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to
third parties”); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that copies of checks and
other bank records kept by a bank do not receive Fourth Amendment protection under the reasoning that
the “Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party . . . even
if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed”). See generally, e.g., Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322, 335–36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971); Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). For a more recent reference to the Third Party Doctrine, consider United
States v. Charbonneau. United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1185 (S.D. Ohio 1997)
(finding there is a reasonable expectation of privacy until the recipient of the message “forwards the
e-mail to a third party”).
98. Katz, at 363 (White, J., concurring).
99. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.
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complete the call.100 In United States v. Miller, copies of an
individual’s business documents possessed by a bank were not
afforded Fourth Amendment protection because the documents had
been voluntarily shared with the bank.101
Considering the service agreements used by a variety of cloud
computing service providers, many individuals have argued that the
Third Party Doctrine will foreclose the possibility of Fourth
Amendment protection against the government accessing a party’s
files in a cloud computing environment.102 A broad range of service
agreements exist, but the majority fall into three general
categories:103 (1) an all-inclusive access agreement allowing the
provider significant access and control over uploaded files,104 (2) a
generic, general access agreement allowing the provider access
primarily to monitor for objectionable content,105 and (3) an overtly
limited access agreement allowing the provider little to no access to a
100. Id. at 742 (“[W]e doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the
numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone
company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed.”).
101. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (holding that respondent’s “information voluntarily conveyed to the
banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business” has “no legitimate
‘expectation of privacy’”).
102. See Robison, supra note 7, at 1226–28; Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107
MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009).
103. See Robison, supra note 7, at 1215.
104. E.g., Google Terms of Service, supra note 18 (“By submitting, posting or displaying the content
[users] give Google a perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide, royalty-free, and non-exclusive license to
reproduce, adapt, modify, translate, publish, publicly perform, publicly display and distribute any
Content which [users] submit, post or display on or through [Google’s services].”).
105. E.g., Amazon Web Services: Terms of Use, supra note 10 (stating that Amazon “reserves the
right (but not the obligation) to remove or edit such content, but does not regularly review posted
content,” and “has the right but not the obligation to monitor and edit or remove any activity or
content”); ICloud Terms and Conditions, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal/icloud/en/terms.html (last
visited Oct. 19, 2011) (“Apple reserves the right at all times to determine whether Content is appropriate
and in compliance with this Agreement, and may pre-screen, move, refuse, modify and/or remove
Content at any time, without prior notice and in its sole discretion, if such Content is found to be in
violation of this Agreement or is otherwise objectionable.”); MobileMe Terms of Service, APPLE,
http://www.apple.com/legal/mobileme/en/terms.html (last visited May 26, 2011) (on file with Georgia
State University Law Review) (“Apple reserves the right at all times to determine whether Content is
appropriate and in compliance with these TOS, and may pre-screen, move, refuse, modify and/or
remove Content at any time, without prior notice and in its sole discretion, if such Content is found to be
in violation of these TOS or is otherwise objectionable.”); Yahoo! Terms of Service, YAHOO!,
http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-173.html (last visited May 26, 2011) (“Yahoo! and its
designees shall have the right (but not the obligation) in their sole discretion to pre-screen, refuse, or
remove any Content that is available via the Yahoo! Services.”).
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user’s files.106 Many providers make it clear in their service
agreements that they may access and monitor users’ activities and
files.107 Some users may argue that they still have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their files since many service providers are
very specific in stating what they may or may not do with a user’s
files.108 But the Court in United States v. Miller stated that there was
no expectation of privacy “even if . . . information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”109
Comparing this language to the language in many service
agreements—such as Amazon’s agreement giving it “the right but
not the obligation to monitor and edit or remove any activity or
content”110—it is reasonable that the Third Party Doctrine will
prevent the application of Fourth Amendment protection against
certain service providers.
This argument does have its weak points, though. First, some
service agreements go out of their way to assure users that the
provider will not view the user’s files.111 In that context, the Third
Party Doctrine would likely not apply, and courts would be forced to
use multiple methods of interpreting the Fourth Amendment for the
cloud computing environment. Second, the Court raised concerns in
Smith v. Maryland that the supposed voluntary choice the plaintiff
made to share the phone number he dialed with the phone company
was not actually voluntary.112 Justice Marshall’s dissent in Smith
106. E.g., Privacy: Decho Corporation Privacy Policy, MOZY, http://mozy.com/privacy (last visited
May 26, 2011) (online file backup service provided at Mozy.com states in its privacy policy that Decho
“will not view the files that [users] backup using [Decho’s service]”).
107. See supra notes 104–105.
108. E.g., Amazon Web Services: Terms of Use, supra note 10 (Amazon “reserves the right . . . to
remove or edit . . . content”).
109. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
110. Amazon Web Services: Terms of Use, supra note 10.
111. See supra note 106.
112. Smith v. Maryland, 42 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Implicit in the concept
of assumption of risk is some notion of choice. At least in the third-party consensual surveillance cases,
which first incorporated risk analysis into Fourth Amendment doctrine, the defendant presumably had
exercised some discretion in deciding who should enjoy his confidential communications. By contrast
here, unless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has become a personal or professional
necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance. It is idle to speak of ‘assuming’ risks in
contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative.” (citation omitted)).
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expressed concern that a person had no choice but to either accept
potential surveillance or not use a phone—considered to be “a
personal or professional necessity.”113
Similarly, individuals may also end up with no choice but to use
cloud computing environments as more and more businesses and
individuals embrace them,114 since the majority of service
agreements allow some form of access to a user’s files by the service
provider.115 If service agreements continue to embrace the notion of
accessing user’s files, users of cloud computing services may find
themselves with no alternative other than to assume the risk of
storing information on cloud computing sites with no expectation of
privacy.
III. THE FUTURE OF CLOUD COMPUTING: HOW PRIVACY RIGHTS
SHOULD APPLY ONLINE
A. Several Current Recommendations Exist
While the courts have been slowly addressing the issue of how
much privacy should be given to online files and emails, practitioners
and academics have put forward a variety of solutions, including: the
virtual container approach, the content/no content approach, and the
loss of privacy online approach.116 As discussed below, these
solutions are inadequate or incomplete, and courts and Congress
should instead: (1) apply the Fourth Amendment to online
environments using a virtual container approach that focuses on the
use of a username and password to prevent public access to the
container, (2) interpret the ECS language broadly to find webmail
service providers to be Electronic Communication Service providers,
(3) amend the RCS language to include a warrant requirement similar
to that found in the ECS language, and (4) allow the Third Party
Doctrine to eliminate a Fourth Amendment claim for any all113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Stone & Vance, supra note 8, at B1; Office Politics, supra note 6.
See supra notes 104–105.
See discussion infra Part III.A.1–3.
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inclusive access agreements while preventing the Third Party
Doctrine from eliminating a Fourth Amendment claim for generic,
general access agreements or overtly limited access agreements.
1. A Virtual Container That Conceals its Contents
Throughout the evolution of the Fourth Amendment, courts have
applied its protection to situations involving containers that conceal
their contents from the general public, such as briefcases, backpacks,
and the home.117 Courts have distinguished containers that effectively
conceal their contents from the general public from those that reveal
their contents.118 A suggested solution to the question of how to
apply the Fourth Amendment to an online environment is to look at
the online world as analogous to the physical world and focus on the
concept of virtual containers.119 A virtual container in the cloud
computing context would be a folder or email account hosted on a
remote server.120 A court would then focus on whether that virtual
container effectively concealed its contents from the outside world
and, if the contents were effectively concealed, the Fourth
Amendment would provide the same level of protection that any
other concealed container would receive.121 Effective concealment of
a virtual container’s contents would be shown through the use of a
username and password, electronic encryption, or some other form of
protection that prevents the general public from accessing the virtual
container or its contents.122

117. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 351 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that
searches of backpacks and purses violated the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Freire, 710 F.2d
1515, 1519 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding Fourth Amendment privacy rights in a briefcase).
118. United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that a gun case that was labeled
“gun guard” did not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy because the label clearly revealed the
contents of the container, with the court stating that “[a]lthough a person generally has an expectation of
privacy in items he places in a closed container, some containers so betray their contents as to abrogate
any such expectation”).
119. See Couillard, supra note 27, at 2233–37.
120. See id. at 2233–34.
121. United States v. D’Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 122 n.16 (D. Mass. 2007), rev’d, 648 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 2011) (“A website, like a computer file, is properly analogized to a file cabinet or other
physical containers in which records can be stored.”); Couillard, supra note 27, at 2236.
122. See Couillard, supra note 27, at 2236.

Published by Reading Room, 2012

19

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 6

518

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:2

Although the virtual container solution seems like a reasonable
approach in most contexts, the use of electronic encryption on
uploaded files does not fit well with an analogy to containers in the
non-virtual world.123 When addressing methods of concealing data in
the non-virtual world, courts have focused on whether police have
legal access to the data itself while assuming that, if the police have
such access, they are free to attempt to decode or reconstruct the
data.124 Claiming an electronic file uploaded to a particular site
should receive Fourth Amendment protection if encrypted but not
providing protection to the same file uploaded to the same site if
unencrypted makes little sense. Courts should focus on the virtual
container the file is stored in rather than the encryption applied to the
file itself.
2. Content/Non-Content
An interesting distinction has been made between items in
electronic communications that qualify as content versus noncontent.125 Non-content items are electronic tags that are required to
send, receive, and identify messages.126 In an email, the non-content
123. See id. at 2234 (arguing that encryption should be recognized as a form of concealment that will
invoke Fourth Amendment protection while acknowledging that “an encrypted letter sealed in an
envelope would be covered by the Fourth Amendment, but the legal basis for its protection would be the
envelope, not the encryption”); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption
Create a “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?”, 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 506 (2001) (arguing that
merely encrypting or encoding data cannot ensure Fourth Amendment protection and “the decryption of
ciphertext cannot violate a reasonable expectation of privacy”).
124. See United States v. Longoria, 177 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when defendant was recorded speaking of illegal activities
in Spanish even though he specifically used Spanish to prevent individuals he was standing with, who
were not in on the illegal activities, from understanding his statements); United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d
927, 930 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that the government did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights when the government seized and reconstructed shredded tax records that defendant shredded in an
attempt to conceal records from the government); United States v. Rubinstein, No. 09-20611-CR, 2010
WL 2723186, at *11–12 (S.D. Fla. June 24, 2010) (recommending that evidence recovered from a
desktop with a warrant not be suppressed despite the government’s delay in examining the computer
while expressing no concern that investigators attempted to decrypt an encrypted drive found on the
computer). For a further discussion of encryption technologies and issues, see Kerr, supra note 123, at
506, and Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors
in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 391–96 (2010).
125. See Kerr, supra note 27, at 1019–23.
126. See id. at 1019–20.
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would likely be considered the “To” and “From” fields in the
message.127 Content, on the other hand, would be the text of an
electronic communication—the actual message itself.128 This
distinction is compared to postal letters in the non-virtual world.129
The outside of letters and packages can be inspected without any
concern over violating the sender’s Fourth Amendment rights—
similar in nature to inspecting the “To” and “From” fields in an
electronic communication.130 The inside of the letter cannot be
opened and inspected without proper Fourth Amendment
permission—similar again to the subject line and the text of an
electronic communication.131
This distinction between content and non-content works well for
many different forms of electronic communication, but it becomes
less useful when applied to documents stored online. What is the
content or the non-content of an electronic document? Possibly the
title of the electronic file would be considered non-content while the
text of the document itself would be the content. The challenge with
that division is that the file name may well reveal the subject of the
document. In a warrantless review of an email or a postal letter,
however, the authorities should not review the subject line of an
email or the subject matter of a postal letter.132
Recognizing the difficulty of applying a content/non-content
distinction to online documents, one approach is to apply a
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 39 C.F.R. § 233.11 (2010); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (“Letters and sealed
packages of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their
outward form and weight . . . . Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and examined under like
warrant . . . .”); Kerr, supra note 27, at 1019–20.
131. 39 C.F.R. § 233.11 (2010) (stating that even if postal workers suspect a piece of mail is
dangerous to people or property, the workers must screen the package “without opening mail that is
sealed against inspection or revealing the contents of correspondence within mail that is sealed against
inspection”); Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 (“The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be
secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed
against inspection, wherever they may be.”); Kerr, supra note 27, at 1019–20.
132. 39 C.F.R. § 233.11 (2010); Kerr, supra note 27, at 1030. Even postal regulation blatantly
recognizes the importance of protecting the content of correspondence. 39 C.F.R. § 233.11 (2010)
(stating that workers screen packages “without . . . revealing the contents of correspondence within mail
that is sealed against inspection”).
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content/non-content approach to electronic communications and
apply a different approach to documents stored in the cloud.133
However, this approach would force courts and practitioners to use
two different methods to analyze the available Fourth Amendment
protection to an individual’s cloud computing account. With the everexpanding list of companies that provide both online document
storage and email services—such as Apple or Google—it makes
more sense to develop one method to apply to all online cloud
computing activities.134
3. Loss of Privacy Online
Despite the possible applications of the Fourth Amendment and
the SCA to today’s online environment, there is an argument for
simply embracing the idea that individuals should have little to no
online privacy. The cofounder of Sun Microsystems, Scott McNealy,
is now infamous for his blunt statement, “You have zero [online]
privacy anyway. Get over it.”135 Given the SCA’s limiting language
and a lack of clear understanding as to what law applies to online
files if the SCA does not, it is reasonable to believe that online
privacy may not currently exist.136
Although individuals and companies may be wise to operate under
this assumption until online privacy is more clearly understood,
allowing an ongoing general lack of online privacy is a significant
mistake. Cloud computing environments have enormous potential,
not only through saving money and providing greater convenience,
but also through additional benefits like far less energy consumption

133. Kerr, supra note 27, at 1019–20, 1029 (arguing primarily for the application of content/noncontent distinctions to electronic communications).
134. ICloud: Calendar, Mail, and Contacts, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/icloud/features/calendarmail-contacts.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2011); ICloud: Documents in the Cloud, APPLE,
http://www.apple.com/icloud/features/documents.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2011); MobileMe Features,
APPLE, http://www.apple.com/mobileme/features/ (last visited May 26, 2011) (on file with Georgia
State University Law Review) (“MobileMe keeps your mail, contacts, and calendar information in the
cloud . . . .”); Products, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/options/ (last visited May 26, 2011).
135. Eric Cohen, Privatization of American Morality, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2001, at M1; Robison,
supra note 7, at 1195.
136. See discussion supra Part I.A; Robison, supra note 7, at 1239.
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per household and, thus, a greener world.137 Scaring individuals and
companies away from cloud computing by limiting the Fourth
Amendment’s application to online environments and narrowly
reading the SCA language would severely constrict the benefits of
cloud computing.
B. An All Encompassing Approach
An effective solution for managing cloud computing and privacy
concerns online must address three different elements: (1) the
application of the Fourth Amendment to cloud computing
environments, (2) how the SCA will apply to cloud computing
situations not contemplated when the SCA was initially created, and
(3) how service agreements and the Third Party Doctrine will
influence the application of both the Fourth Amendment and the
SCA.
1. The Fourth Amendment Online
Courts should apply the Fourth Amendment to online
environments using a virtual container approach. The virtual
container approach requires a username and password. Several courts
have already applied the Fourth Amendment to online
environments.138 Throughout the history of the Fourth Amendment,
courts have stressed the importance of applying the Fourth
Amendment to “people, not places.”139 It is important to recognize
that, as cloud computing becomes more prevalent, people will
continue to upload more and more of their personal documents to the
cloud. Courts should focus on a person’s Fourth Amendment rights
rather than on the fact that a person may store her personal files in a
new location. The court in United States v. Freire reasoned that
briefcases carry such close, personal items—such as “address books,
137. FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 232–33 (detailing how, by using a machine called a Sun Ray
terminal at home to log on to the cloud, the user can conserve significant energy by not using a
traditional PC).
138. See discussion supra Part I.B.
139. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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personal calendar/diaries, [and] correspondence”—that they warrant
Fourth Amendment protection.140 Cloud computing embraces all of
these functions.141 If an individual mailed a postal letter or printed a
document at home and carried it in her briefcase to work, both the
letter and the document would receive Fourth Amendment
protection.142 It makes little sense to claim that if instead of mailing a
letter she sent an email, and if instead of printing a document she
uploaded the document to the cloud and retrieved it when she arrived
at work, neither of her documents would be protected by the Fourth
Amendment.143
Certainly not all online files should be protected. If an individual
uploads a file to a public site, accessible by anyone, that individual
has exposed the file to the public, and no protection should be
extended to the file. Although the Court in Katz specified that “what
[a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.”144 While the Court
clearly recognized the importance of protecting personal files, the
Court also used the language “may be” rather than “is.” Drawing a
distinction as to which files should receive constitutional protection
in a cloud computing environment is a complicated process. Courts
should embrace the concept of the virtual container, but focus on the
container itself rather than the file uploaded to the cloud.145
Essential to extending constitutional protection to online
environments is the idea of a virtual container that conceals its
contents through the use of a username and password, showing the
individual’s attempt to preserve her privacy.146 MobileMe’s service
140. United States v. Freire, 710 F.2d 1515, 1519 (11th Cir. 1983); Couillard, supra note 27, at 2210–
11.
141. ICloud: Calendar, Mail, and Contacts, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/icloud/features/calendarmail-contacts.html
(last
visited
Oct.
19,
2011);
MobileMe
Features,
APPLE,
http://www.apple.com/mobileme/features/ (last visited May 26, 2011) (on file with Georgia State
University Law Review) (“MobileMe keeps your mail, contacts, and calendar information in the
cloud . . . .”). See discussion supra Introduction.
142. Couillard, supra note 27, at 2238.
143. Id.
144. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
145. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
146. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822–23 (1982) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment provides
protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain view.”).
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provides a helpful distinction between online files that should receive
Fourth Amendment protection and online files that should not.147 A
user of MobileMe’s service has two different virtual containers: a
private folder and a public folder.148 The private folder is accessible
to only those particular individuals that have the user’s username and
password, while the public folder is accessible to anyone who has the
web address.149 Much like a briefcase, backpack, or postal package,
the private, password-protected virtual container effectively conceals
its contents from the general public and should receive constitutional
protection through the user’s Fourth Amendment rights. The public
folder, on the other hand, reveals its contents to whoever has the web
address and should receive no constitutional protection.150 This
virtual container understanding should be applied to all cloud
computing environments, extending Fourth Amendment protection to
webmail services or any other cloud computing services that conceal
the contents of an online container behind a username and password.
If, on the other hand, the contents of a container are visible to anyone
with knowledge of the container’s online location, Fourth
Amendment protection should not be extended.
2. The SCA’s Future
In addition to applying the Fourth Amendment to the cloud
computing environment, the SCA must be read broadly to prevent the
Act from being found unconstitutional. Courts should interpret the
ECS language broadly to find webmail service providers to be
Electronic Communication Service providers. The flexible
interpretations in both Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc. and
Jennings v. Jennings, where the courts found webmail providers and
147. MobileMe’s iDisk Features, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/mobileme/features/idisk.html (last
visited May 26, 2011) (on file with Georgia State University Law Review).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. While the default setting allows anyone with the web address to access files in the public folder,
there is an option to password protect the public folder to limit general, public access to it. For
simplicity’s sake, MobileMe’s iDisk service will be analyzed assuming the service retains its default
setting. MobileMe: How to Password-Protect Shared Files in your iDisk, APPLE,
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT2127 (last visited Oct. 19, 2011).
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social networking sites to be Electronic Communication Service
providers, should guide future courts in applying the ECS
language.151 A strict interpretation of the SCA may lead courts to find
a webmail service provider does not qualify as an Electronic
Communication Service and thus find the SCA does not require that
same provider to demand a warrant from the government to search
and seize webmail.152 This interpretation would have contradictory
results: while the user would have Fourth Amendment rights in his
webmail service, the SCA would not force his webmail service
provider to require a warrant for a governmental search. This
contradiction could potentially threaten the constitutionality of the
ECS portion of the SCA. Thus, an interpretation of the ECS language
allowing webmail service providers to qualify as Electronic
Communication Service providers is essential.
The Legislature should amend the RCS language to include a
warrant requirement similar to that found in the ECS language.
Simply requiring a subpoena or a court order should not be enough.
Even the broad interpretation of the RCS language found in Crispin
should not prevent it from being found unconstitutional.153 If a court
qualifies a cloud computing provider as a Remote Computing Service
provider, a warrant is not necessarily required for a government
agency to search and seize online documents.154 The Act will be in
direct conflict with the application of the Fourth Amendment to cloud
computing environments through the virtual container method. On
the one hand, the Fourth Amendment would require the government
to get a warrant to search any files stored in a virtual container
protected by a username and password. On the other hand, the RCS
language would not require a warrant and instead, merely require a
subpoena or a court order to access the files even if a court did find

151. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 987 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Jennings v.
Jennings, 697 S.E.2d 671, 676 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010), reh’g denied, 2010 S.C. App. LEXIS 176 (S.C. Ct.
App. Aug. 27, 2010).
152. See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); discussion
supra Part II.A.
153. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
154. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
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that a service provider qualified as a Remote Computing Service.155
Given this contradiction, the RCS language must be amended. It
should incorporate a warrant requirement similar to that found in the
ECS section of the SCA, which requires a warrant to access files
stored in a password-protected virtual container.
3. Service Agreements and the Third Party Doctrine
Courts should allow the Third Party Doctrine to eliminate a Fourth
Amendment claim with any all-inclusive access agreements while
preventing the Third Party Doctrine from eliminating a Fourth
Amendment claim with generic, general access agreements or overtly
limited access agreements.156 While the initial presumption by courts
should be that the Fourth Amendment applies to cloud computing
environments, the service agreements of cloud computing providers
will have an enormous influence on whether Fourth Amendment
rights will ultimately require warrants for government searches of an
individual’s cloud computing files. Of the three standard types of
agreements, two are relatively easy to address.157 The all-inclusive
agreement, embraced by companies such as Google, that allows
significant access and control over uploaded files to the service
provider should be recognized as a user voluntarily sharing
information with a third party and, thus, eliminate the user’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.158 The lack of a reasonable
expectation of privacy on the user’s part should then eliminate the
user’s Fourth Amendment protections as to the cloud computing
155. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
156. It is worth noting that users may not actually read the access agreements—commonly in the form
of click-wrap or click-through agreements requiring users to click a button labeled ‘Agree’ before they
proceed—when they sign up for cloud computing services. The question of whether a user will be held
to an access agreement that he did not read is a valid question, but it is outside the scope of this Note.
This Note assumes that access agreements between a user and a service provider are valid. For further
discussions on the enforceability of click-wrap or click-through agreements, see Nathan J. Davis,
Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of Clickwrap, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 577–78 (2007);
Lucille M. Ponte, Getting a Bad Rap? Unconscionability in Clickwrap Dispute Resolution Clauses and
a Proposal for Improving the Quality of These Online Consumer “Products”, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 119, 120 (2011); Ty Tasker & Daryn Pakcyk, Cyber-Surfing on the High Seas of Legalese: Law
and Technology of Internet Agreements, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 79, 85–86 (2008).
157. See discussion supra Part II.C.
158. E.g., Google Terms of Service, supra note 18.
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files. Agreements that are overtly limited and allow the provider little
to no access to a user’s files should not qualify as a user voluntarily
sharing information with a third party and, thus, should allow a user
to reasonably expect privacy. 159 This reasonable expectation should
translate into an extension of the user’s Fourth Amendment rights to
her online files.
Applying the Third Party Doctrine to a generic, general access
agreement that allows the provider general access primarily to
monitor for objectionable content is not as straightforward.160
Although providers do have access to a user’s files, that access is
distinguishable and far more limited than access given to providers
with all-inclusive access agreements.161 The agreement allows
providers to generally monitor the files uploaded by a user but does
not suggest a continuous, intrusive monitoring by the provider. The
distinction between constant monitoring and more general
monitoring is similar to a distinction made by the court in United
States v. Maynard, examining a scenario in the non-virtual world.162
The court in Maynard found that police violated a driver’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements when they attached a GPS
tracking device to his car without a warrant and tracked his every
move for a month.163 While the court acknowledged that an
individual does not generally have a reasonable expectation of
privacy when he moves about in public, the court distinguished an
individual merely moving about for a short time in public and police
tracking his every move for a month.164

159. E.g., Privacy: Decho Corporation Privacy Policy, supra note 107.
160. E.g., Amazon Web Services: Terms of Use, supra note 10; ICloud Terms and Conditions, supra
note 106; MobileMe Terms of Service, supra note 106; Yahoo! Terms of Service, supra note 106.
161. Compare Google Terms of Service, supra note 18, with ICloud Terms and Conditions, supra
note 106, and MobileMe Terms of Service, supra note 106.
162. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558, 563, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
163. Id. at 558 (noting that the use of the GPS device allowed the police to discover “the totality and
pattern of [the defendant’s] movements from place to place to place”).
164. Id. (“[U]nlike one’s movements during a single journey, the whole of one’s movements over the
course of a month is not actually exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe all
those movements is effectively nil. . . . [T]he whole of one’s movements is not exposed constructively
even though each individual movement is exposed, because that whole reveals more . . . than does the
sum of its parts.”).
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The distinction drawn by the court in Maynard is important when
considering the application of the Third Party Doctrine to cloud
computing environments. Under a generic monitoring service
agreement providing general access, a user should have a reasonable
expectation of privacy since the provider does not explicitly state that
it will review each file uploaded by the user. The provider instead
will perform only occasional monitoring functions. This situation is
distinguishable from Smith v. Maryland where the phone numbers an
individual dialed had to be shared with the phone company to
complete every single call.165 This situation is also distinguishable
from United States v. Miller where the documents a customer shared
with the bank were each individually reviewed by the bank’s
employees “in the ordinary course of business.”166
If a provider with a generic, general access agreement begins to
closely monitor a user’s activity or turns files over to the government
without requiring a warrant, the user’s reasonable expectation of
privacy and Fourth Amendment rights should be considered violated
pursuant to Maynard. There is a significant difference between
sporadically viewing and continuously monitoring or claiming a
license to every file that is uploaded. Unless the service agreement
specifically states that every file is reviewed by or licensed to the
provider—as in the all-inclusive service agreements or a traditional
Third Party Doctrine case—a user should reasonably expect privacy
in her cloud computing documents. To ensure users understand what
is at stake, the wording of an all-inclusive access agreement should
explicitly state that a user’s Fourth Amendment rights in any
documents uploaded to the cloud are lost if the user agrees to the allinclusive access agreement.
CONCLUSION
Concerns over what privacy rights exist for online documents have
left many individuals and companies questioning the wisdom of
165. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
166. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
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embracing cloud computing.167 Given the potential advantages that
cloud computing services offer, courts should clarify the privacy
rights given to cloud computing environments. The Fourth
Amendment should apply to online environments, and courts should
adopt a virtual container model that recognizes the distinctions
between a username and password protected container and a
container available to the general public.168 The Electronic
Communication Service language of the SCA should be interpreted
broadly to avoid conflicting with the Fourth Amendment, while the
Remote Computing Services language of the SCA should be found
unconstitutional given its conflict with the Fourth Amendment—no
matter what interpretation is applied.169 The Remote Computing
Services language should then be amended to include a warrant
requirement.170 While the Third Party Doctrine should also be
applied to the cloud computing environment, it should be applied
narrowly—only to those service agreements that grant service
providers all-inclusive access to a user’s files.171 Courts should give
users as much online privacy protection as possible to ensure
individuals and companies will readily embrace cloud computing and
the benefits it can provide.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See discussion supra Introduction.
See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
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